A surprising connection on LinkedIn. An offer of employment from a headhunter, probably a young woman, operating from China. The chance to make perhaps £20,000 on the side writing a small number of political analyses for a Chinese company containing “non-public” or privileged insights. Payment in digital currency or cash preferred.
It may seem clear, on this telling, that an element about this approach would be suspicious. However, China’s influential intelligence agency continues to view it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to try it – leading MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity on the internet.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said Chinese agents were contacting UK citizens on LinkedIn on an extraordinary level, at a rate of ten thousand over the previous 30-month period, seeking governmental, commercial, military and technological secrets. But a new campaign aimed at politicians and parliament has prompted the intelligence service to take further action.
A spying alert was issued on Tuesday via the offices of the Commons speaker and his Lords counterpart: a single slide after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and Amanda Qiu to reach out to Members of Parliament, lords, their assistants, economists, research organizations – anyone who might become a source.
Security Approach and Legal Updates
In the typical manner of British intelligence, there was no official release of the protective guidance from the agency or the Home Office. Yet the service knew its advisory document would become public once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Republishing it in the media assists the general population more easily recognize communications with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the impact of flushing out more information from in and around parliament, although that is not the agency's primary purpose. The service aims for public figures to recognize that just because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Additionally, the internal security service believed to have been reacting to any specific incident in parliament, though the recent actions does come after the embarrassing collapse of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide an individual and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of working for the foreign power – a allegation they denied – but inability to successfully conclude a trial under the since replaced Official Secrets Act resulted in concerns that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Updated Legislation and China's Long-Term Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the MI5 slide includes a note of its replacement: “Individuals involved in espionage activity risk substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” This constitutes a crime if a person participates in behavior that is or is likely to “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.
A natural question, however, is what Beijing has to achieve. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted knowledge of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs less so. But the Chinese government is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a period, in recent years, the Britain's approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the human rights situation or genocide was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Variations and Persistent Cyber Threats
In part there are distinct approaches as well. Autocratic regimes like Beijing's export information gathering techniques and the size of its spy network is vast, engaging three hundred thousand individuals. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under the US administration, said it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have more English speakers involved in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is prepared to develop contacts over the long term and sometimes even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for what information is deemed to be of value,” the minister responsible Dan Jarvis informed parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the government situation may result in someone rapidly peripheral turning important.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless activities at covert information gathering is in the wider context of the international competition between Beijing and the Western nations at a threshold under the level of outright war. The nation has increased its cyber operations, with the one campaign penetration of phone and data networks in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless connected equipment.
Beijing is involved in relentless attempts to identify secret informants on UK politics online because it seeks to be challenging, to display power and because it has the capability.
